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Although research has shown that there may be very different types of workplace crimes, scholarly work in this area(a) is currently fragmented with very little communication between very similar streams of research and (b) tends to
be incomplete and can lead to conflicting findings. We address both of these shortcomings. First, we propose a typology
of different types of workplace crimes (consisting of pro-organizational, nonaligned-organizational, and anti-organizational
crimes) based on the intentions of the perpetrators. Second, we link these intentions to various identification “pathologies”—
such as over-identification and over-disidentification, under-identification and ambivalent identification—and argue that
these pathologies are linked to propensities to commit certain types of workplace crimes. Specifically, we contend that
over-identification and over-disidentification have direct effects on workplace crimes, whereas under-identification and
ambivalent identification indirectly influence the propensity to engage in workplace crimes. We suggest that this research
aids us in clarifying the inconsistent conclusions in previous work in the domain of workplace crimes and that it emphasizes
the importance of including organizational identification as a key factor in the extant models of workplace crimes. This
research also highlights policy implications regarding workplace crimes in that it suggests that different agencies may be
more effective in enforcing the law and disciplining those engaged in the different types of workplace crimes.
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Introduction
In the wake of several corporate scandals, there has been
a renewed interest in better understanding workplace
crimes. In addition to reputation-based costs, U.S. cor-
porations estimate that they lose 5% of their revenues
because of workplace crimes (Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners 2010). In dollar terms, this figure trans-
lates to approximately $2.9 trillion in losses, with more
than one quarter of companies losing at least $1 mil-
lion. Even after Enron and similarly salient instances of
misconduct, episodes of workplace crime remain high
(Ethics Resource Center 2009). In fact, a 2008–2009
study on ethics in the workplace revealed that “nearly
three out of four employees (74%) report that they
have personally observed or have firsthand knowledge
of wrongdoing within their organizations during the pre-
vious 12 months” (KPMG 2009, p. iii).
Such significant losses provide renewed motivation to
better understand the underpinnings of workplace crimes
so that episodes of such activity can be minimized.
However, attempts to explore the antecedents of work-
place crimes have been hindered in at least two ways.
First, workplace crimes include many different types
of crimes (see Pinto et al. 2008, Treviño et al. 2006,
Vardi and Wiener 1996). Further, research in this area
is fragmented and is conducted in silos with very lit-
tle communication between similar streams of scholarly
work. Thus, broad-brush approaches to understanding all
workplace crimes are often limited in scope (Treviño
et al. 2006). Second, although the investigation of the
precursors of workplace crimes has informed our knowl-
edge of the conditions that facilitate such crimes (see
Kish-Gephart et al. 2010 and Tenbrunsel and Smith-
Crowe 2008 for recent reviews and meta-analyses), this
research tends to be incomplete and can lead to conflict-
ing findings. To illustrate, in work on top management
fraud, some research suggests that a higher proportion of
outsiders on boards decreases illegal activities by firms
(Beasley 1996); other research finds no such relationship
(e.g., Kesner et al. 1986).
We argue that (a) development of a typology based
on intended outcomes and (b) consideration of the
individual–organizational bond as a motivational expla-
nation for workplace crimes help address both concerns.
Specifically, focusing on intended outcomes provides a
common comparison point for all types of workplace
crimes, whereas focusing on individual–organizational
relationships as individuals’ motivations for workplace
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crimes points to the importance of how these relation-
ships shape crime propensities in very different ways.
With regard to these individual–organizational relation-
ships, we argue that to the degree that an employee
loves, hates, is indifferent, or is even ambivalent toward
his or her organization will not only predispose him or
her to engage in workplace crimes but will also influence
the type of workplace crime committed. These states of
relating to an organization match well with extant work
on the expanded model of organizational identification
and various identification “pathologies” (Dukerich et al.
1998, Elsbach 1999, Pratt 2000).
We begin by reviewing extant research on workplace
crimes to create a typology of such crimes. As we do
this, we argue that one key difference among the motives
for these crimes involves how the individual relates to
his or her organization. Drawing on theories of organiza-
tional identification, we then develop hypotheses about
how different forms of identification are related to dif-
ferent types of workplace crimes.
Typology of Workplace Crimes
We use the term “workplace crimes” broadly to denote
the illegal, illegitimate, or immoral actions deliber-
ately committed by employees in the workplace. Work-
place crimes have often been studied on the basis of
crimes committed (e.g., Ambrose et al. 2002, Clinard
and Quinney 1973, Greenberg 2002), individual or group
involvement (e.g., Daboub et al. 1995, Pinto et al. 2008,
Szwajkowski 1985), victims (e.g., Aquino and Bradfield
2000, Bennett and Robinson 2000, Warren 2003), orga-
nizational position (blue-collar versus white-collar) of
the perpetrator (e.g., Aguilera and Vadera 2008, Clinard
1983, Sutherland 1940), as well as on the basis of crimes
specific to a particular industry (Calavita et al. 1997,
Flannery and May 2000).
These varied conceptualizations have significantly
added to our knowledge of workplace crimes; nonethe-
less, they are limited for two reasons. First, some
(but not all) conceptualizations tend to overlook why
individuals engage in crime in the first place. For
instance, although research on prosocial unethical behav-
iors and organizational corruption explicitly focuses on
the intended outcomes of the perpetrators—“to poten-
tially benefit the organization” (Umphress et al. 2010,
p. 769) and “chiefly for personal benefit” (Aguilera
and Vadera 2008, p. 434) respectively—scholarly work
on other workplace crimes tends to look at the actual
outcomes instead of the intentions of the transgres-
sor. Consider the study by Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly
(1998), who, while conceptualizing antisocial behaviors,
argue that these behaviors are “negative” and “have the
potential to cause harm to individuals and/or the prop-
erty of an organization” (p. 658). These scholars, along
with others who study antisocial behaviors and related
notions, do not claim that the intentions of the perpetra-
tors are to harm the organization but simply state that
the engagement in these behaviors may have unintended
negative effects on the organization and its members.
This discrepancy in the treatments of intentionality in
workplace crimes makes various types of crime hard
to compare. For example, it is difficult to ascertain
how crimes in the accounting industry (e.g., fraudulent
financial statements) are related to employees’ antiso-
cial behaviors, such as organizational retaliatory behav-
iors (Skarlicki and Folger 1997) and workplace incivility
(Pearson et al. 2001).
Following Treviño et al. (2006) and others (see Zahra
et al. 2005), we view crime as deliberate and thus
intentional—i.e., with the motivated objective to con,
cheat, or swindle internal and external stakeholders.
Consequently, we feel that intentionality provides a com-
mon comparison point for all types of workplace crime.
Other researchers (Greve et al. 2010, Zahra et al. 2005),
while reviewing extant literatures on crime at the top
management level and/or organizational level, have also
recently made similar claims and proposed that to fully
understand the precursors of organizational crime, it is
important to consider the varied intentions of the perpe-
trators. Therefore, in this paper, we draw from the extant
research on workplace crimes and develop a typology
based on the intention, or more specifically, the intended
outcomes, of the crimes. That is, we pay particular
attention to whether the motivation to engage in work-
place crimes is based on the organization being bene-
fitted, harmed, or not affected by the crimes. A focus
on intended outcomes will help researchers navigate
the dizzying number of crime-related concepts, many
of which use similar terms. For example, intended out-
comes cleanly differentiate a corrupt organization from
an organization of corrupt individuals (Pinto et al. 2008),
as well as corporate crime (Box 1983) from occupational
crimes (Clinard and Quinney 1973).
Second, and similarly, because these different ap-
proaches to workplace crimes are fragmented and each
approach generally tends to focus on a limited range
of workplace crimes, there is often very little com-
munication among similar streams of research, further
complicating efforts to examine organizational crime in
a more coherent fashion. For example, on one hand,
research on corporate illegality (Mishina et al. 2010,
Szwajkowski 1985) and unethical prosocial behaviors
(Umphress et al. 2010) investigates the structural and
individual antecedents of crimes that benefit the orga-
nization; on the other hand, studies on deviance, anti-
social behaviors, and counterproductive work behaviors
(Bennett and Robinson 2000, Brass et al. 1998, Clinard
and Quinney 1973, Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly 1998)
examine the precursors of crimes that are conducted
against the organization and its members. Each focuses
on crimes in the workplace, but because there is very
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little overlap between these streams of research, it is dif-
ficult to ascertain which factors are likely to motivate
employees to commit which types of workplace crimes.
We contend that an explicit focus on intended outcomes
allows us to compare insights across a broad spectrum of
workplace crimes and build on the cumulative insights
from each subfield. Given the high costs organizations
and members endure because of these crimes, this lack
of integrative focus is unfortunate.
In this paper, we adopt a bottom-up approach to build
a typology of workplace crimes based on intended out-
comes to ameliorate the fragmented literature, and we
develop a theoretical framework that provides a parsi-
monious explanation for what motivates different types
of workplace crimes. Although we integrate much of the
literature on workplace crimes, we acknowledge that our
more micro-oriented approach is different from research
focusing on more structural approaches—such as studies
focusing on perceptions of organizations’ ethical climate
(Victor and Cullen 1988), ethical culture (Treviño et al.
1998), ethical infrastructure (Tenbrunsel et al. 2003), and
ethical leadership (Brown and Treviño 2006). However,
as we will argue in more detail later, we believe that how
one identifies with an organization will play a critical
role as to whether, how, and to what degree, individu-
als will attend to ethical climates, ethical infrastructures,
and organizational leadership.
Consistent with much prior research, we assume that
the individual perpetrator always intends to gain some
benefit from engaging in the crime (see Treviño and
Youngblood 1990). Beyond this self-serving motive,
however, extant research suggests that workplace crimes
can be delineated based on the intended impact on the
organizations that employ the perpetrators. For example,
some types of workplace crimes may be intended to ben-
efit both the perpetrator and the organization (e.g., orga-
nizational illegality), some types may be intended to
benefit the perpetrator at the expense of the orga-
nization (e.g., antisocial behaviors), and some types
may be intended to benefit only the perpetrator, with-
out consideration of the impact such crimes may have
on the organization (e.g., organizational corruption).
We refer to these different types of workplace crimes as
pro-organizational, anti-organizational, and nonaligned-
organizational, respectively. These various crime types
are listed in Table 1 and are elaborated below.
Pro-Organizational Workplace Crime
As noted in Table 1, our review of the research on
workplace crimes revealed that work on “organiza-
tional illegality,” “corporate crimes,” “unethical proso-
cial behaviors,” and “corrupt organizations” (Baucus and
Near 1991, Calavita et al. 1997, Pinto et al. 2008,
Szwajkowski 1985, Umphress et al. 2010) covers work-
place crimes that are carried out with the intention to
benefit the organization. For instance, organizational ille-
gality is conceptualized as legally prohibited action that
is taken by organizational members primarily on behalf
of the organization (Szwajkowski 1985). In a similar
vein, corporate crime has been defined as “illegal acts
committed by individuals (agents) in pursuit of either
corporate interests or the joint interests of the firm
and the agents” (Cloninger 1995, p. 51). Tombs (1993,
p. 334) quotes Box (1983) to similarly define corpo-
rate crime as “illegal acts of omission or commission
of an individual or group of individuals in a legitimate
formal organization, in accordance with the goals of
that organization” (also see Calavita and Pontell 1990,
Glasberg and Skidmore 1998, Schrager and Short 1978).
In addition, Umphress et al. (2010) conceptualize uneth-
ical prosocial behaviors as actions that are intended to
promote the effective functioning of the organization or
its members but that violate core societal values, mores,
laws, or standards of proper conduct. Finally, a corrupt
organization is said to exist when “a group collectively
acts in a corrupt manner for the benefit of the organiza-
tion” (Pinto et al. 2008, p. 668).
We refer to these activities as pro-organizational work-
place crimes. Pro-organizational workplace crimes can
thus be conceptualized as workplace crimes that are
enacted for the purpose of advancing one’s own inter-
ests as well as the organizational interests in some way.
A common illustration of pro-organizational workplace
crime would be financial reporting fraud by the senior
managers of an organization. Financial reporting frauds
are misrepresentations by agents of a publicly listed firm
about the firm’s financial condition (Kang 2008). Fraud-
ulent misrepresentations violate the generally accepted
accounting principles, often to the end of achieving a
desired level of reported earnings (Rosner 2003). As evi-
dent from the recent corporate scandals, financial report-
ing frauds have an implicit intention of benefiting not
only the perpetrators (top management in most cases)
but also the organization and its shareholders by falsely
inflating the stock prices.
Anti-Organizational Workplace Crime
Our review revealed a second type of workplace crime
in which individual members may engage (see Table 1).
We term this type of crime as anti-organizational work-
place crime. Anti-organizational workplace crimes can
be defined as workplace crimes that are enacted with
the intent to benefit oneself and harm the organization.
Concepts such as “unethical behaviors,” “occupational
crimes,” some forms of “deviance,” “antisocial behav-
iors,” and “counterproductive work behaviors” (Bennett
and Robinson 2000, Brass et al. 1998, Clinard and
Quinney 1973, Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly 1998) can
be considered as anti-organizational workplace crimes.
Unethical behavior is generally defined as behavior that
has a harmful effect on others and is either illegally
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Table 1 Integration of Workplace Crimes with Other Similar Concepts
Type of work- Nonaligned-
place crime: Pro-organizational organizational Anti-Organizational
Related Organizational Unethical Organizational Unethical
concepts: illegality prosocial behavior corruption Deviance behavior
Definitions Legally prohibited
action of
organization
members that is
taken primarily
on behalf of the
organization
(Szwajkowski
1985)
Actions that are intended
to promote the effective
functioning of the
organization or its
members but that
violate core societal
values, mores, laws, or
standards of proper
conduct (Umphress
et al. 2010)
The crime that is
committed by the
use of authority
within
organizations for
personal gain
(Aguilera and
Vadera 2008)
Voluntary behavior that
violates significant
organizational norms
and in doing so
threatens the
well-being of the
organization, its
members, or both
(Robinson and
Bennett 1995)
Behavior that has a
harmful effect on
others and is
either illegal or
morally
unacceptable to
the larger
community
(Brass et al.
1998)
Primary
beneficiaries
Individual+
Organization
and/or its
members
Individual + Organization
and/or its members
Individual Individual Individual
Intended victims Organization and/or its
members
Organization and/or
its members
Closely related
concepts
Corporate illegality;
illegal corporate
behavior
Corporate crime Government
corruption;
political
corruption;
corporate
corruption;
collective
corruption
Antisocial behaviors;
dysfunctional
behaviors;
counterproductive
work behaviors
Examples Toxic waste
poisoning;
misrepresentation
in financial
statements
Concealing information;
exaggerating the truth;
misrepresenting the
truth
Accepting bribes;
insider trading;
corporate
violence
Using abusive
language; putting
little effort into work
Stealing; lying
or morally unacceptable to the larger community (Brass
et al. 1998). Occupational crime refers to violations of
the law by employees in the course of their occupa-
tions and against their employers (Clinard and Quinney
1973). Similarly, workplace deviance has been concep-
tualized as “voluntary behavior that violates significant
organizational norms and, in doing so, threatens the
well-being of the organization or its members, or both”
(Bennett and Robinson 2000, p. 349, emphasis added).
Finally, even though Bloch and Geis (1970) do not
explicitly discuss anti-organizational workplace crimes,
they state that workplace crimes should be delineated,
and one of the categories should include offenses com-
mitted by employees against the business or employ-
ers. Typical examples of anti-organizational workplace
crimes include theft and sabotage in the organization,
violations in the sale of securities, and embezzlement.
Nonaligned-Organizational Workplace Crime
A third type of workplace crime that individuals could
engage in is nonaligned-organizational workplace crime.
This type of crime entails workplace crimes that benefit
the perpetrator without any intentional effect (harm or
benefit) on the organization. Nonaligned-organizational
workplace crime is related to “organizational corruption”
and “an organization of corrupt individuals” (Aguilera
and Vadera 2008, Ashforth et al. 2008, Pinto et al. 2008).
Corruption is generally defined as the abuse/misuse of
public power for private benefit (Robertson and Watson
2004, Rodriguez et al. 2005). This definition of cor-
ruption encompasses a wide range of phenomena, from
a police officer accepting money from drug traffickers
to an employee stealing supplies from work for per-
sonal use. There are several different forms of corrup-
tion; however, in all (or nearly all) the definitions and
explanations of corruption, including the one on organi-
zational corruption that looks at the use of authority for
personal benefit (Aguilera and Vadera 2008), researchers
talk of corruption as a gain for oneself—without not-
ing how such actions are intended to either harm or
benefit the organization (Zimring and Johnson 2005).
In a related vein, Pinto et al. (2008, p. 688) put forth
the notion of an organization of corrupt individuals “in
which a significant proportion of an organization’s mem-
bers act in a corrupt manner primarily for their personal
benefit.” The focus of this work is on organizations, but
individuals in these cases are acting in a criminal manner
that we would categorize as nonaligned-organizational.
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Although it may be possible for the perpetrator of
nonaligned-organizational workplace crimes to predict
the hurt and benefit for the organization in committing
a crime, the crime itself is not motivated with the inten-
tion to either help or harm the organization—only to
benefit the perpetrator. Consider a situation in which
an individual bribes an executive at a firm for (inside)
information about the firm so that he can manipulate
(buy, sell, or hold) stocks of the firm to ensure maxi-
mum profitability for himself. In this case, it could be
argued that both individuals engaged in insider trading
to benefit themselves, with little or no regard for the
implications of their actions on the firm(s). Thus, this
illegal activity could be considered as an illustration of
nonaligned-organizational workplace crime.
To summarize, pro-organizational workplace crimes
involve offenses that are intended to benefit both
the individual and the organization. Anti-organizational
workplace crimes refer to deliberate acts that may not
just benefit the perpetuator but may also cause harm to
the organization. And nonaligned-organizational work-
place crimes include offenses by individuals that person-
ally benefit them but do not intentionally help or harm
the organization. Thus, each type of workplace crime
has a different motivation: to benefit, harm, or have no
effect on the organization.
Workplace Crimes and
Organizational Identification
Our emphasis on intended outcomes begs the question of
why individuals would intend to hurt, benefit, or ignore
the organization when committing a crime. We argue
that a key motivator in determining whether and which
type of crime is committed is the type of relationship an
individual has with his or her employing organization.
As we note below, the concept of organizational iden-
tification effectively explains these various motivations,
especially when compared with similar constructs.
Organizational identification is a special kind of social
identification, often referring to the emotional–cognitive
link between an individual and organization. It is a
“feeling of oneness” (Ashforth and Mael 1989) that
occurs as one’s organization becomes self-referential
(Pratt 1998). We draw heavily on work on organiza-
tional identification for three main reasons. First, iden-
tification has been found to be highly motivational
(van Knippenberg 2000), thus providing the impetus
for actions such as crimes. Second, because it involves
a self-referential attachment to a particular organiza-
tion, this attachment type is organization specific, just
as workplace crimes are often perpetrated with specific
organizations in mind. Concepts such as commitment,
by contrast, focus on a match with organizationally held
values and goals. However, these values and goals may
be espoused by many other organizations; consequently,
unlike identification, commitment is not viewed as being
organization specific (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Third,
unlike other attachment constructs such as commitment
and person–organization fit that tend to focus primarily
on the degree (high to low levels) of cognitive attach-
ment with the organization (see also Pratt 1998 for a
distinction between these concepts), organizational iden-
tification differentiates among affectively positive, neu-
tral, negative, and ambivalent types of attachments—and
it delineates the strength of these attachments (Dukerich
et al. 1998). Thus identification provides a force (moti-
vation), target (organization), and valence (positive, neg-
ative, ambivalent, or neutral) that match well with our
notions of pro-, anti-, and nonaligned-organizational
workplace crimes.
Focusing on identification also complements and
enriches other earlier work on the individual-level
antecedents of workplace crimes (see Kish-Gephart
et al. 2010 and Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008 for
recent reviews and meta-analyses). Most of the prior
research focusing on the individual-level factors influ-
encing workplace crimes has examined the role of demo-
graphic variables such as age, experience, education, and
gender (Ambrose and Schminke 1999, Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1990), as well as other individual difference fac-
tors such as cognitive moral development (Ashkanasy
et al. 2006, Treviño and Youngblood 1990), moral iden-
tity (Aquino and Reed 2002), individual propensity
for risk (Junger et al. 2001), locus of control (Forte
2005), and the value placed on money (Leap 2007).
For instance, youth, a lack of experience and education,
high tolerance for risk, and greed are sometimes posi-
tively associated with involvement in workplace crimes
(Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, Junger et al. 2001, Leap
2007, Levine 2000, Zahra et al. 2005). However, such
treatments do not differentiate how and when such indi-
vidual differences may lead someone to commit different
types of workplace crimes.
Let us consider greed (Levine 2000), which has played
a central role in work on individual-level motivations.
Greed has mostly been conceptualized as the fear of
loss and the effort to defend against it (Levine 2000).
The greedy person thus is constantly aware of the threat
of loss and, because of this, is driven to attempt to
take from others lest they take from him or her (see
Levine 2000). Therefore, when an opportunity to com-
mit a crime presents itself, greed makes the employee
aware of his potential losses (and others’ benefits) if
he does not engage in the crime. Thus, greed is con-
sidered to play an important role in the propensity to
commit workplace crimes. However, research also shows
that not all greedy people commit workplace crimes or
commit the same types of crimes (see Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe 2008)—that is, those that might intention-
ally harm or benefit the organization. In this paper, we
suggest that how employees form connections to their
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organizations may have implications for the relationship
between greed and workplace crimes. As we will explain
in detail, we believe that greed may provide a motiva-
tion to act, but how this motivation is channeled toward
(e.g., for, against, or without regard to) the organization
will be determined by the form or nature of one’s orga-
nizational identification.
Focusing on organizational identification also helps in
understanding heretofore mixed results in research on
workplace crimes. To illustrate, consider the research
noted in the introduction on the effects of the compo-
sition of the board of directors of a firm on the like-
lihood of commission of illegal activities of the firm.
The primary responsibility of the board of directors is
to monitor the organization (Fama and Jensen 1983).
It would, therefore, be expected that an increase in the
number of outside members on the board of directors
of a firm would decrease the likelihood of fraud in
the firm. Although this increase may sometimes lead to
less fraud (Beasley 1996), Kesner et al. (1986) stud-
ied the organizational characteristics that affect financial
statement-related fraud and demonstrated that the per-
centage of outsiders on the board of directors is not sig-
nificantly related to the number of illegal acts. We pro-
pose that these contradictory findings may be resolved
by studying the identification of these outside members
with the organization. Fraud, for example, may be per-
petrated to either protect (e.g., falsify records to please
shareholders) or harm (e.g., embezzlement) an organiza-
tion. Boards that “love” their organizations may be more
likely to squelch anti-organizational crimes but may turn
a blind eye toward pro-organizational crimes such as cer-
tain types of fraud.
This focus on different forms of identification is rela-
tively new. Traditionally, much of the research on orga-
nizational identification has focused on the positive in
two respects. First, scholars have focused on positive
evaluations or feelings toward an organization (e.g., I
feel proud to be associated with this organization); thus,
to identify with an organization means that one feels
some positive affection toward that organization (Pratt
1998). Second, the emphasis has been on potential pos-
itive effects for both individuals and their organizations.
For example, organizational identification may meet an
individual’s needs for self-esteem, uncertainty reduction,
and belongingness (Ashforth and Mael 1989, Deaux
et al. 1999, Dutton et al. 1994, Hogg and Mullin 1999,
Pratt 1998) and may lead to greater job satisfaction and
motivation among employees (Alpander 1990). Organi-
zational identification may also benefit the organization
by increasing employee loyalty toward the organization
(Adler and Adler 1988) and motivating employees to
act in the organization’s best interests (Cheney 1983,
Pratt 2000). For example, highly identified employees
may contribute financially to an organization (Mael and
Ashforth 1992) and engage in more extra-role, prosocial
behaviors (Olkkonen and Lipponen 2006).
Recent research, however, has shown that identifica-
tion with an organization need not be experienced in
terms of positive affect (i.e., there are different forms of
identification), nor does such identification always result
in benefits for the individual and his or her organiza-
tion. With regard to the different forms of identification,
research has provided evidence of an “expanded model”
of identification (Elsbach 1999, Kreiner and Ashforth
2004, Pratt 2000) that demonstrates that one’s relation-
ship with an organization need not be positive, as it
is with identification, but that it can also be negative
(i.e., disidentification), mixed or confusing (i.e., ambiva-
lent, conflicting, or “schizo” identification), or indif-
ferent (i.e., neutral identification). Kreiner and Ash-
forth (2004) demonstrate the validity and utility of the
expanded model and show that the four types of identi-
fication are related yet discrete. Scholars who take this
expanded perspective view organizational identification
(a positive-valence force) and organizational disidentifi-
cation (a negative-valence force) as independent forces
that determine how one ultimately relates to an organi-
zation. Thus, one can be either high or low on identifica-
tion and high or low on disidentification (e.g., Ashforth
2001, Elsbach 1999, Kreiner and Ashforth 2004, Pratt
2000).
Individuals can range in their degree of identification
and disidentification, sometimes to a dysfunctional or
pathological degree. Thus, Dukerich et al. (1998) posit
that four types of identification pathologies are possible
when crossing high and low identification with high and
low disidentification: over-identification (high identifi-
cation, low disidentification), under-identification (low
on both identification and disidentification), ambivalent
identification1 (high on both identification and disiden-
tification), and over-disidentification (low on identifi-
cation, high on disidentification). They even begin to
suggest a link with crime via over-disidentification,
noting how it may “result in sabotage, resistance, or
aggressive behaviors aimed at the organization and its
representatives” (Dukerich et al. 1998, p. 251). As we
have discussed, however, workplace crimes entail inten-
tional acts committed by individuals not only to harm the
organization but also to benefit or even have no effect on
the organization. We therefore adopt the full expanded
model of identification as it relates to identification
pathologies (Dukerich et al. 1998, Pratt 1998) to help
explain why one’s identification with the organization
influences one’s propensity to commit different types of
workplace crimes. We propose that over-identification
and over-disidentification have direct effects on work-
place crimes. That is, those who “love” or “hate” the
organization are more likely to engage in crimes that
benefit or harm the organization, respectively. By con-
trast, under-identification and ambivalent identification
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may have indirect effects on workplace crimes such that
these identification types may interact with other condi-
tions to result in pro-organizational, anti-organizational,
and nonaligned-organizational workplace crimes. Our
major propositions are captured in Figures 1–4.
Over-Identification
Over-identification is a condition whereby a portion of
one’s identity is too wrapped up in the organization; as
a result, the uniqueness of the individual is largely lost
(Dukerich et al. 1998). Thus, an individual is said to
have over-identified with the organization when he or
she cannot think of him- or herself as anybody but a
member of the organization. In essence, the organization
as a collective becomes an “extension” of the individ-
ual’s self-construal.
Such extension of one’s self-construal is common in
the literature, as individuals can incorporate both posses-
sions via an “extended self” (e.g., James 1890, Maccoby
1980) and relationships via “self-expansion” (Aron and
Aron 1986) into their self-views. With regard to the
former, Maccoby (1980, p. 252) argues that “the self
can be extended beyond a notion of ‘me’ to include
‘my’ 0 0 0 [it] is a psychological construct in which the
concept of me and the concept of my are blended.” Sim-
ilarly, research on self-expansion theory suggests that
self-expansion is facilitated by inclusion of the other in
the self (Aron et al. 1991). Though it is often implicit,
social identity theory also argues that such an expansion
or extension of one’s self-construal does occur; however,
it moves the referent from individuals to a broader social
collective (e.g., organizations). This argument suggests
that individuals who over-identify with the organization
have expanded their sense of self so that the distinc-
tion between the self and the organization is completely
blurred.
Over-identification and identification have similar
hedonic tones (both are positive because of high iden-
tification, and both lack negative hedonic tones because
of low disidentification), but they differ in terms of
strength. The high level of attachment exhibited by over-
identifiers can amplify or even distort the benefits of
identification to an unhealthy degree. For example, an
over-identified individual is highly motivated and will
conform to organizational dictates, but this state may
also involve loss of an independent and autonomous
sense of self, decreased creativity and risk taking, over-
confidence and overdependence on the collective, loss
of ability to question the ethicality or legality of orga-
nizational actions, increased distrust and vulnerability in
case of layoffs or loss of reputation of the firm, and
heightened use of tyrannical behaviors by both leaders
and followers (Ashforth and Mael 1996, Dukerich et al.
1998, Dutton and Dukerich 1991, Mael and Ashforth
1992, Pratt 2001).
Based on both self-expansion and self-verification,
we propose that when individuals over-identify with the
organization, they are more likely to engage in pro-
organizational workplace crimes. Self-expansion argues
that an individual’s self-construal includes one’s organi-
zational membership. And according to self-verification
theory (Burke 1991, Burke and Harold 2005, Swann
1983, Swann and Read 1981, Swann et al. 1992), once
individuals form self-views, they work to stabilize them
by seeking and embracing experiences that match their
self-views and by avoiding or rejecting experiences that
challenge them. And when faced with a challenging
situation that potentially threatens individuals’ view of
the self, they are motivated to respond to this situa-
tion both affectively and behaviorally. The behavioral
response is generally to modify the situation (Burke and
Harold 2005).
Based on this research, we argue that when individ-
uals over-identify with an organization, they may be
willing to “step over the line” to protect and other-
wise help the organization in order to maintain their
self-view. Over-identified individuals may thus be more
likely to commit crimes on behalf of the organization
and to attempt to cover up its wrongdoings. This rela-
tionship is illustrated in the recent scandal at Enron. In
his court trial, Jeff Skilling—the number two executive
at Enron—noted that he “bled Enron blue” (Emshwiller
and McWilliams 2006b, p. C3). Some reports suggested
that this bond was unhealthy and may have contributed
to his engagement in the pro-organizational workplace
crimes. One article on the Enron scandal noted that
[Skilling] suffered from an “obsession” with Enron and
that he came to realize that his professional life had
overshadowed his personal life, and he “wanted to die”
when he heard about the layoffs at Enron (Emshwiller
and McWilliams 2006a, p. C1). In addition, Skilling
notes that his intention was to help, not harm, Enron.
For instance, on being accused of turning to LJM part-
nerships (LJM stands for Lea, Jeffrey, and Michael—the
names of the children of Enron CFO Andrew Fastow)
to buy Enron’s poor assets and investments so that
the energy company could hide debt and boost earn-
ings, Skilling claimed that he used the partnerships as
quasi-investments for the company so that these partner-
ships could act as a hedge, because “we [Enron] needed
to protect shareholders” (Emshwiller and McWilliams
2006b, p. C3). This over-identification therefore may
have made the decision to use questionable investing
and bookkeeping easier to justify. Evidence that Skilling
was engaged in self-verification/self-protection dynam-
ics during his court hearing was further illustrated by
his need to prevent, in his own words, the following
scenario: that Enron employees’ recollections are going
to be wrong, and no one will understand. This inter-
pretation of events supports Levine’s (2005, pp. 726–
727) view that Enron leaders did not see themselves as
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Figure 1 Schematic Representation of Over-Identification
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“crooks, or even amoral manipulators of the system” but
rather as “doing good.”
In short, we propose that because over-identification
results in the loss of a personal self in favor of the orga-
nization, as suggested by self-expansion, actions to pro-
tect and further the goals of the organization may be
viewed as protecting oneself, and harming the organi-
zation would equate to engaging in self-harm. Further-
more, self-verification theory suggests that individuals
will go to great lengths to validate and protect their self-
construal. Thus, we argue that over-identification should
be negatively related to anti-organizational workplace
crimes—crimes that intend to harm the organization.
Similarly, given the salience of the organization and its
centrality in a person’s self-definition, it is unlikely that
the over-identified employee would engage in actions
that do not take into account its impact on the orga-
nization. This suggests that over-identifiers would also
be less likely to engage in nonaligned-organizational
workplace crimes (see Figure 1). Hence we argue the
following.
Proposition 1. Employees engaging in workplace
crime who over-identify with their organization are more
likely to engage in pro-organizational workplace crimes
than in nonaligned-organizational or anti-organizational
workplace crimes.
Over-Disidentification
Organizational disidentification is defined as “a self-
perception based on (1) a sense of active separa-
tion between one’s identity and the identity of the
organization, and (2) a negative relational categoriza-
tion of oneself and the organization” (Elsbach 1999,
p. 179). Unlike identification, where self-enhancement is
achieved through one’s similarity with the organization,
disidentification leads to self-enhancement through dis-
association with the organization and the creation of neg-
ative distinctiveness (e.g., I am proud that I do not value
what my organization values, or the organization defines
who I am not). Mild forms of disidentification may not
be problematic for an organization (e.g., it may provide
a needed critical voice for overly cohesive groups), but
over-disidentification—whereby the forces of identifica-
tion and disidentification are highly skewed in favor of
the latter—may pose significant problems for the orga-
nization. This is especially true because this form of
attachment is associated with powerfully negative emo-
tions such as hate or anger, which have been found
to predict actions that lead to organizational harm (see
Pratt 2000).
Because over-disidentification involves strong, nega-
tive feelings toward an organization, employees with
this type of attachment may not share their organiza-
tional affiliation with nonorganizational others, may be
vocal about the aspects of the organization they dis-
like, and/or may try to differentiate themselves from
the organization by identifying with some other charac-
teristics that make them distinct (Kreiner and Ashforth
2004). In their study of the National Rifle Associa-
tion (NRA), Elsbach and Bhattacharya (2001) found that
individuals who claimed to disidentify with the NRA
carried out counterorganizational actions such as boy-
cotting products and making organizationally disparag-
ing public claims. Over-disidentified individuals within
an organization therefore may be willing to engage in
offenses that more strongly dissociate them from the
organization by inflicting harm to the organization.
Although not labeled disidentification and anti-
organizational workplace crimes, these two concepts
have been linked anecdotally in stories about indi-
viduals who “hate” their organizations and retaliate
against them. For example, in a series of autobiographi-
cal essays on sabotage in the workplace, Sprouse (1992)
offers numerous examples that would support our main
arguments. In one of the essays, Jason, a bank teller,
commented on developing a strong dislike for his work-
place after it underwent a major reorganization. As a
result, he began to engage in crimes that intentionally
hurt the organization. He started cashing bad checks
even if they were forged or scammed. On days that were
important for the bank (such as paydays for welfare,
Social Security, municipal, among others), both Jason
and his soon-to-be wife (the only two bank tellers who
spoke English as their first language) did not go to work.
All this amounted to huge losses for the bank. Miss-
ing from such anecdotes, however, is the implication of
identity. However, Giacalone and Rosenfeld (1987) have
argued that employee aggression in the workplace may
be motivated by a desire to project an identity that is
opposite of what the employee feels is being ascribed
to him or her by a manager (also see Ashforth and
Mael 1998). They note that “sabotage is an individual’s
way of establishing what he/she is not” (Giacalone and
Rosenfeld 1987, p. 369, emphasis in original). Extrapo-
lating from these findings, we argue that employees who
are over-disidentifiers are more likely to commit anti-
organizational workplace crimes.
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Figure 2 Schematic Representation of Over-Disidentification
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The main mechanism linking over-disidentification
with anti-organizational crimes is self-verification
(Burke 1991, Burke and Harold 2005, Swann 1983,
Swann and Read 1981, Swann et al. 1992). As with over-
identification, over-disidentifiers still see their organiza-
tions as highly central to their self-definitions—though
there is less blurring of person and organization, as
is the case with over-identifiers. Moreover, disidenti-
fiers will act on those self-definitions in ways that con-
demn the organization; thus, for example, disidentified
Amway distributors are those who create and maintain
websites denouncing Amway (Pratt 2000). Such actions
against the organization are self-verifying—reinforcing
the notion that the organization stands for “who I am
not.” Extending this logic, over-disidentifiers tend to
oppose suggestions or initiatives by the organization
(Dukerich et al. 1998) and are less likely than those
who do not disidentify to act on behalf of the organi-
zation’s best interest. They are, therefore, not likely to
commit pro-organizational workplace crimes. Moreover,
because over-disidentifiers are bound to the organiza-
tion by their negative distinctiveness, we believe that
they are also less likely to commit acts of nonaligned-
organizational workplace crimes because they will tend
to focus on ways to harm the organization as a signal of
resistance and defiance. Our propositions regarding over-
disidentification and workplace crimes are illustrated in
Figure 2 and summarized in the following way.
Proposition 2. Employees engaging in workplace
crime who over-disidentify with their organization are
more likely to engage in anti-organizational workplace
crimes than in nonaligned- or pro-organizational work-
place crimes.
Under-Identification
Whereas over-identification and over-disidentification
both refer to attachments characterized by strong emo-
tional bonds—where one can hate or love an organi-
zation too much—the lack of an emotional connection
to an organization may also be problematic. Individ-
uals who “under-identify” or who are severely apa-
thetic toward an organization experience chronically
low levels of identification and disidentification. Under-
identification is therefore akin to anomie such that the
individual is not anchored in the social context. Under-
identification may be found in people who either are
incapable of identifying with the organization or just do
not care to be identified with the organization (Dukerich
et al. 1998).
In contrast to over-identified individuals whose per-
sonal self is lost in their organizational “social” iden-
tity, under-identifiers are more likely to be motivated by
their idiosyncratic or “personal” identities (Turner 1999).
Moreover, although under-identification in and of itself
may not lead to workplace crimes (i.e., because it pro-
vides no direct motivation for crime), it may explain
why some individual differences sometimes lead to such
crimes. To illustrate, reviews by Daboub et al. (1995)
and Zahra et al. (2005) point to the importance of cer-
tain demographic traits, such as age, tenure, and educa-
tion, as moderating the influence of organizational struc-
tures on committing workplace crimes. Specifically, they
argue that individual differences (e.g., low education and
youth) that are associated with characteristics that are
highly self-centered—such as recklessness, immediate
gratification, or low moral development (see also the role
of narcissism in Levine 2005)—are likely to increase the
propensity toward criminal activity. However, the rela-
tionship between these traits and actual criminal behav-
ior is mixed (see Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008).
Thus, not every highly self-centered person commits an
organizational crime.
We argue that under-identification may moderate the
effects of the aforementioned individual differences.
Specifically, weakening ties with the organization may
make it more likely that individuals will (a) disregard
organizational rules meant to prohibit criminal behavior
and (b) free up the individual to act on his or her per-
sonal wants and desires. Thus, as we depict in Figure 3,
individuals prone to immediate gratification and extreme
self-interest may be more likely to act on these interests
when they are apathetically identified with the organiza-
tion. In short, we argue that under-identification makes
individuals less sensitive to organizational norms and
structural features such as ethical climate (Victor and
Cullen 1988), ethical culture (Treviño et al. 1998), eth-
ical infrastructure (Tenbrunsel et al. 2003), and ethical
leadership (Brown and Treviño 2006). This indifference
Figure 3 Schematic Representation of Under-Identification
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to the organization and its rules and policies thus intensi-
fies the effects of self-centered individual differences on
workplace crimes. This logic supports the claims made
by Daboub et al. (1995) that the effects of these self-
centered individual differences are most likely to occur
when situational constraints are weak.
Although the research of Daboub et al. (1995) does
not specify the type of workplace crime that are associ-
ated with these self-centered characteristics, Zahra et al.
(2005) suggest that certain demographic variables may
be tied to a wide range of workplace crimes. Building
on our logic above, we believe that these characteristics,
when possessed by an individual who does not have any
strong feelings toward the organization, are most likely
to lead to nonaligned-organizational workplace crimes.
As we have argued, both pro-organizational and anti-
organizational workplace crimes suggest a strong pre-
existing bond with the organization: pro-organizational
workplace crime is associated with over-identification,
and anti-organizational workplace crime is associated
with those who strongly disidentify with the organiza-
tion. Lacking such organizational bonds, the behavior
of those who are apathetic is not likely to be chan-
neled directly into either helping or harming the orga-
nization. Thus, for those who are both self-centered
and under-identified with their organization, nonaligned-
organizational workplace crime, where the focus is on
how the crime benefits the individual—regardless of the
impact on the organization—is likely to follow.
Proposition 3. Under-identification moderates the
effects of self-centered individual differences (e.g., low
cognitive moral development) on criminal behavior
such that those holding these characteristics are more
likely to engage in nonaligned-organizational workplace
crimes.
If under-identification is likely to make personal
motives more salient—and thus increase the probabil-
ity that an individual will act selfishly in committing
nonaligned-organizational crimes—it begs the question
of how those with strong identification (e.g., over-
identification) may respond if they are also greedy.
Building on our previous arguments, the expression of
greed is likely to be influenced both by the strength
on one’s identification and by its valence. For exam-
ple, when one strongly identifies with a social entity
such as an organization, we know that the standards of
behavior move from personal to social (Turner 1999).
Thus, it may be that greedy individuals who are also
over-identifiers may express this greed in ways that ben-
efit both themselves and the organizations they serve,
thereby making them more susceptible to committing
pro-organizational crimes. Alternatively, a strong bond
with an organization may also serve to inhibit one’s
selfish impulses on behalf of the greater collective.
We return to these arguments in our discussion section.
Ambivalent Identification
Ambivalent identification occurs when an individual
simultaneously highly identifies and disidentifies with
the same organization (Dukerich et al. 1998). According
to Wang and Pratt (2008), ambivalent identification can
occur when an individual identifies with some beliefs
or values of the organization and disidentifies with oth-
ers, or when the individual simultaneously identifies and
disidentifies with the same aspects of the organization
(Kreiner and Ashforth 2004). Research suggests that
ambivalently identified employees will be highly moti-
vated to resolve their ambivalence (Pratt 2000, Pratt and
Doucet 2000)—but how might they resolve it, and what
relation might it have to workplace crimes?
Ambivalence-amplification theory (Katz and Glass
1979) posits that ambivalence may be resolved via the
formation of overly positive or overly negative attitudes.
Such resolution may be aided by actions taken on the
part of the object of one’s ambivalence. Building from
the premise that attitudes about certain “stigmatized”
groups (e.g., racial minorities) tend to be more ambiva-
lent than unambiguously hostile or friendly, Katz and
Glass (1979) reviewed a series of laboratory experiments
that explored whether the resolution of ambivalence
leads to stronger negative or positive responses toward
such groups. Their review confirmed an ambivalence-
amplification effect. For example, in a study where sub-
jects in the majority group (white) were asked to give
black confederates a strong shock in a learning exer-
cise, the majority’s attitudes toward the minority sub-
jects changed significantly for the worse; however, this
effect was not found when white subjects were to be
given a shock (either mild or strong). By contrast, results
showed a positive amplification effect by white evalua-
tors when they were asked to evaluate both black and
white stimulus persons, and both stimulus persons were
described as having desirable social traits. Similar pat-
terns of results were found when the target person in the
study was a physically disabled person. These effects
have been replicated in more recent work. Colella and
Varma (2001), for example, found that disabled workers
(the “stigmatized” group) who did not ingratiate were
seen less favorably by managers than nondisabled work-
ers who did not ingratiate. However, disabled work-
ers were more highly favored than their nondisabled
counterparts when both groups engaged in ingratiation
(see also Gibbons et al. 1980 for similar results). This
study thus shows that negative actions (no ingratiation)
by the stigmatized group changed feelings toward the
group from ambivalent to unfavorable ones, and positive
behaviors (ingratiation) changed the ambivalent feelings
to favorable ones. Colella and Varma (2001) attribute
this interaction to an ambivalence-amplification effect.
Building on this research, we argue that ambivalent
identification with an organization may be resolved via
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an amplification of one’s feelings toward the organi-
zation. Specifically, ambivalent identification may have
an indirect effect on committing workplace crimes by
making employees more susceptible to forming over-
identification or over-disidentification. Salient events,
such as a corporate scandal or corporate heroics,
may trigger ambivalence resolution and the amplifi-
cation of more uniformly negative or positive atti-
tudes, respectively. Thus, if the organization engages in
salient, socially desirable behaviors or in actions that
are positively evaluated by the employee experiencing
this ambivalent state of identification, then this con-
duct by the organization would be consistent with the
employee’s positive attitude toward the organization and
in contrast to his or her negative attitude toward the
organization. The employee in such cases may engage
in ambivalence-reducing behaviors by making compen-
satory overly positive evaluations of the organization,
thereby leading to over-identification. Ironically, this
would suggest that we would see an increase in pro-
organizational workplace crimes by some employees
after positive actions are made by organizations (see
Figure 4). By contrast, if the organization engages in
socially undesirable behaviors or in actions that are
negatively evaluated by the employee in this state of
ambivalent identification, then the organization’s con-
duct would be consistent with the employee’s nega-
tive attitude toward the organization and in contrast
to her positive attitude toward it. This may lead the
employee to strongly disidentify with the organization.
The employee may, therefore, express such disidentifi-
cation by engaging in very negative behaviors against
the organization, such as extreme denigration (Dienstbier
1970). Thus, we would expect ambivalent employees
to engage in more anti-organizational workplace crimes
following a negative evaluation of the organization (see
Figure 4).
Proposition 4(A). Employees engaging in workplace
crime who ambivalently identify with their organization
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are more likely to commit pro-organizational workplace
crimes in the wake of salient, positive action by the
organization.
Proposition 4(B). Employees engaging in workplace
crime who ambivalently identify with their organization
are more likely to commit anti-organizational workplace
crimes in the wake of salient, negative action by the
organization.
Discussion
In this paper, we propose a typology of work-
place crimes (pro-organizational, anti-organizational,
and nonaligned-organizational) based on intended out-
comes, and we argue that one of the key factors that
may lead organizational members to commit these dif-
ferent types of crime is organizational identification.
We specifically suggest how identification pathologies
such as over-identification, over-disidentification, under-
identification, and ambivalent identification may be
linked to propensities to commit pro-organizational, anti-
organizational, and nonaligned-organizational workplace
crimes. By doing so, we bring together the previously
disparate literatures of workplace crimes and organiza-
tional identification and make contributions to each.
Theoretical Contributions and
Avenues for Future Research
Typology of Workplace Crimes. To begin, we con-
tribute to the literatures in the workplace crimes domain
by providing a parsimonious typology of workplace
crimes, based on their intended outcomes. As noted in
the introduction, there is a dizzying number of ways to
conceptualize and categorize the various crimes under
the rubric of “workplace crimes.” Part of this pro-
liferation of schemes may stem, in part, from view-
ing workplace crimes in terms of crimes committed
(e.g., Ambrose et al. 2002, Clinard and Quinney 1973,
Greenberg 2002), involvement in crimes (e.g., Daboub
et al. 1995, Pinto et al. 2008, Szwajkowski 1985),
victims of the crimes (e.g., Bennett and Robinson
2000, Warren 2003), characteristics of the perpetra-
tor (e.g., Aguilera and Vadera 2008, Clinard 1983,
Sutherland 1940), as well as on the basis of crimes
specific to a particular industry (Calavita et al. 1997,
Flannery and May 2000). Implicit in some of these
conceptualizations, however, is the basic intention of
whether the organization will be harmed, benefited, or
ignored. Thus, we move intentionality to the forefront
and use it as a way to clearly distinguish among three
major types of workplace crimes: pro-organizational,
anti-organizational, and nonaligned-organizational work-
place crimes. By proposing this typology, we hope
to address some of the inconsistent findings regard-
ing workplace crimes by differentiating unique moti-
vators (e.g., identification type) that may lead to these
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crimes. This also helps explain why the same condi-
tions (e.g., publicly negative actions by an organization)
may lead to no crime (no pathological identification)
or to widely disparate crime types (e.g., anti- or pro-
organizational).
Motivational Antecedent of Workplace Crimes. Our
focus on intended outcomes opens our inquiries about
workplace crimes to a new potential individual-level
motivator (van Knippenberg 2000) for such crimes:
organizational identification. In particular, by drawing
on the expanded model of identification and identifi-
cation pathologies, we provide a parsimonious way of
explaining why some individuals will be predisposed
to pro-organizational, anti-organizational, or nonaligned-
organizational workplace crime. We also suggest how
identification types may work in conjunction with other
individual differences that have historically been associ-
ated, though not necessarily consistently tied, to work-
place crimes (see Proposition 3). Thus, a greedy person
who under-identifies with his or her organization is more
likely to commit nonaligned-organizational crimes than
a person who over-disidentifies with an organization.
Building on these arguments, future research may also
want to examine how attachment motivations in organi-
zations may play off each other. It may be that some
combination of organizational identification pathologies
may be particularly devastating for organizations. To
illustrate, organizations filled with a high percentage of
ambivalent identifiers may be particularly attuned to the
identification-related actions of others. Imagine that in
this workplace, an over-identifier engaged in activities
that resulted in a corporate scandal. This scandal, in turn,
may “flip” ambivalent identifiers into over-disidentifiers,
thus increasing the probability that anti-organizational
crimes may then occur when the organization is already
suffering.
Resolution of Conflicting Findings. Another way by
which the propositions in this paper may enrich our
understanding of workplace crimes is by helping us
understand mixed and conflicting results in research on
workplace crimes (see Treviño et al. 2006). One running
example we have used in this paper is the discrepant
findings regarding the impact of having a large percent-
age of outsiders on the board of directors on the occur-
rence of financial statement-related fraud (Beasley 1996,
Kesner et al. 1986). We can further demystify these con-
tradictory findings by closely examining the types of
identification these outside members hold toward their
organizations.
If the outside members on the board of directors
over-identify with the organization, then they are more
likely to work for the benefit of the organization, thereby
ensuring that the top management team of the organi-
zation does not engage in anti-organizational workplace
crimes. Moreover, if such crimes do occur, it is likely
that these board members would attempt to address such
crimes “in house” and not involve the press. With regard
to pro-organizational workplace crimes, over-identifiers
might even collude with executives and managers in per-
petuating such crimes. Thus, from a researcher’s per-
spective, we would notice that crimes, if reported, would
be more likely to be those that benefit the organization.
If the outside board members come to over-disidentify
with the organization (e.g., as the result of resolving an
ambivalent attachment in the face of a corporate scandal
or of joining the board of an organization an individual
dislikes to change it or “destroy it from within”), we
would expect a different pattern to emerge. If the top
management team was engaged in any type of crime,
disidentifying board members might be quick to alert
the press in order to “shame” the organization (although
the response time may be slower when reporting anti-
organizational workplace crimes, as board members may
wait for more damage to be done). Taken together, from
a researcher’s perspective, we would notice that both
more crime and more types of crime would likely be
reported (see Hillman et al. 2008).
Implications for Organizational Identification Re-
search. Our model and propositions also suggest new
avenues for research in identification, especially as it
relates to criminal activity. At a general level, our
research adds to the literature on organizational iden-
tification by focusing on the less positive aspects of
identification. Beyond the role of over-identification
(e.g., Ashforth and Mael 1996, Kramer and Wei 1999),
the “dark side of identification” in organizations has
only begun to be explored (Dukerich et al. 1998). We
contribute to this embryonic literature by proposing
an association between organizational identification and
workplace crimes; we note that both identification type
and strength are critical. Perhaps most obviously, identi-
fication type or its hedonic tone (i.e., positive, negative,
or ambivalent) is critical for establishing the motiva-
tional focus for workplace crimes (i.e., to help or hurt
the organization). However, we also imply that identifi-
cation strength plays a role in two ways.
First, if hedonic tone is kept constant, might there
be an “optimal” level of “positive” identification that
is needed to decrease the potential that workplace
crime will be committed? We have argued that over-
identification and under-identification each can make
members more vulnerable to committing different types
of workplace crimes. This would suggest that some opti-
mal level of organizational identification might deter
someone from engaging in workplace crime. What we
do not know, however, is the range of this optimal level.
For example, at what places along the identification (and
disidentification) continuum (−a) are people most likely
to have healthy (noncriminal) attitudes and engage in
healthy behaviors toward the organization? What orga-
nizational and individual factors might serve to widen or
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narrow this range? In addition, future research may also
wish to examine whether this proposed “inverted U” is
symmetrical. For example, the point at which one moves
from “healthy” identification to under-identification may
be different from the one that governs the move from
healthy identification to over-identification.
Second, strong forms of identification—whether they
are positive or negative—are most likely to have direct
effects on the propensity to commit workplace crimes.
Weak or conflicted attachments (under- and ambiva-
lent identification), by contrast, are more complex and
have more indirect effects. Our extrapolation from
ambivalence-amplification theory suggests that those
with ambivalent identification may be particularly sus-
ceptible to external cues such as salient organizational
actions. Resolution of ambivalence may trigger a sense-
making process whereby individuals scan the environ-
ment for ways to resolve such ambivalence. By contrast,
we can infer from early work on individual differences
and crime propensity (Aquino and Bradfield 2000, Leap
2007, Levine 2005, Treviño and Youngblood 1990) that
under-identified individuals may look more at internal
cues stemming from their personalities. Future research
may wish to further explore the conditions under which
such externally versus internally focused sensemaking
holds, as well as examine a wider range of conditions
that may affect the relationship between attachment and
crime when attachments are not unambiguously strong.
In addition, we have focused on identification patholo-
gies in terms of active engagement in workplace crimes,
but future research may also examine how organiza-
tional identification influences people’s passive acqui-
escence to criminal behavior or other indirect effects
(Daboub et al. 1995). Along these lines, it may be inter-
esting to investigate whether organizational identification
plays a role in how employees react to the illegal acts
of others in the organization. For instance, those who
under-identify with the organization may be less likely
to care about the illicit and unethical behaviors of the
other members in their organization because they do not
view their organization positively or negatively. How-
ever, those who over-identify with the organization are
more likely to pay attention to actions that have a bear-
ing on their organization. In fact, these individuals may
be more likely to encourage crimes that benefit the orga-
nization (i.e., pro-organizational workplace crimes) and
blow the whistle for those crimes that harm the organi-
zation (i.e., anti-organizational workplace crimes). Thus,
it may be fruitful to examine how organizational iden-
tification affects not only the actions of organizational
members but also their inactions toward those engag-
ing in workplace crimes in their organization (also see
Vadera et al. 2009).
Practical Implications
Workplace crime, whether it is done for or against the
organization, is harmful to the shareholders, employ-
ees, stakeholders, and society as a whole. It is there-
fore very important for organizations to be aware of
the different motivational reasons behind these acts so
that they are better able to reduce the likelihood of
occurrences of such crimes. As discussed previously,
managers need to be aware of both the strength and
the quality of their members’ identification. Regard-
ing strength, this paper suggests that over-identification
and under-identification are pathologies that need to be
avoided so that employees can achieve an optimal level
of identification with the organization. Although there
has been relatively little work on “de-escalating” over-
identification, there has been considerable work done
on how organizations can increase identification (Ash-
forth and Mael 1989, Dutton et al. 1994, Pratt 2000),
which may help move employees out of states of under-
identification and ambivalent identification. However, if
identification is too weak, it is unlikely that such indi-
viduals would respond to organizational identification
management attempts. Regarding the quality of identifi-
cation, managers need also be aware of the hedonic tone
of employees’ attachments. Conventional wisdom may
suggest being most attentive to disgruntled (i.e., disiden-
tified) employees, but we suggest that such employees
are only prone to commit certain types of workplace
crime and that other types of emotional ties may also
be destructive. In addition to the potential hazards of
over-identification, managers should also be aware of the
sometimes counterintuitive effects of ambivalent identi-
fication. Again, although it may not be surprising that
incidents of workplace crimes may increase in the wake
of a corporate scandal, heroic actions by the organi-
zation may push ambivalently identified members into
over-identification, which, we propose, could lead to the
commission of pro-organizational workplace crimes.
The distinction among pro-organizational, anti-
organizational, and nonaligned-organizational workplace
crimes may also help policy makers design and enforce
more competent policies and regulations that are more
in tune with the crimes that the organizational members
are involved in (see Vadera and Aguilera 2009). A recent
example of such a policy may be the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which focuses mostly on financial and accounting
misrepresentation; this can be considered as only one
type of workplace crime (i.e., pro-organizational work-
place crime). Thus, understanding the different types
of workplace crime and the identification of individu-
als engaging in these crimes may be the foundation to
develop a more comprehensive theory of the psychology
of workplace crimes for the purpose of designing more
nuanced legislation.
We also assert that understanding these various types
of workplace crimes may help us better identify who
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might be most effective as “watchdogs” for these crimes.
Individuals engaging in pro-organizational workplace
crimes, for example, may receive the support of their
organizations, as these crimes also benefit the organiza-
tions. Additionally, the organizations may be less likely
to sanction such behaviors because of the increase in
profitability for the organizations from these illegal acts.
Therefore, in such cases, outside agencies, which are
independent of the organizations being watched, may
be best positioned to provide the appropriate mecha-
nisms to ensure that the rights and privileges of the
stakeholders are maintained. For individuals commit-
ting anti-organizational workplace crimes, organizations
may penalize such behaviors because these crimes entail
stealing from the organization itself. Because these
crimes are against the organization, the organization
itself may be best suited to develop mechanisms to con-
trol and persecute members engaging in such crimes.
Given that nonaligned-organizational identification does
not have direct effects on workplace crimes, it may be
best that policies and procedures focus on the factors
that this type of identification may moderate (e.g., self-
centered, individual-level differences).
Conclusion
Corporate scandals and other workplace crimes con-
tinue to dramatically impact individuals, organizations,
and societies. We propose that research on understand-
ing and preventing criminal behavior in organizations
can be facilitated by (a) organizing the various types of
workplace crimes into a parsimonious typology based
on intended outcomes and (b) better understanding a
key individual-level motivator for those intentions—the
nature and strength of an employees’ identification.
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Endnote
1Dukerich et al. (1998) refer to this pathology as “schizo”
identification. However, “schizo” often refers to schizophrenia,
which is associated with hallucination and delusions but does
not, in fact, refer to a split personality (also known as disso-
ciative identity disorder). Thus, we use the term “ambivalent”
to capture the opposing attractive and repulsive forces inherent
in this form of identification (Pratt and Doucet 2000).
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